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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/942,978	08/31/2001	Ken Kutaragi	100809-16279 (SCEW 18.968	7677
	7590		EXAMINER	
575 MADISON	AVENUE	VAN HANDEL, MICHAEL P		
NEW YORK, N	NY 10022-2585		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2623	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			05/09/2008	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
09/942,978	KUTARAGI ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	
MICHAEL VAN HANDEL	2623	

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The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>08 April 2008</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP	LICATION IN CONDITION FOR AL	LOWANCE.	
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appelor Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit eal (with appeal fee) in compliance v	, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expires 5 months from the mailing date b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire to Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(1)	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth i ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	date of the final rejection	n.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date of have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount of hortened statutory period for reply origin	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed wi	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, be a considered and amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, be a considered amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, be a considered and a considered amendment and a cons	nsideration and/or search (see NOT w); ter form for appeal by materially rec	E below); lucing or simplifying th	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)). 4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): 6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s). 7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE	9 and 11 under 35 USC 101. owable if submitted in a separate, t will not be entered, or b) will	imely filed amendmer	nt canceling the
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 	I sufficient reasons why the affidavi	t or other evidence is	necessary and
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation 	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea and was not earlier presented. Se	ll and/or appellant fails ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1)	s to provide a).
 REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER 11. ☐ The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet. 	,	condition for allowan	ce because:
12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i>(s). (13. ☐ Other:	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
/Chris Kelley/ Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2623			

Continuation of 11.

The examiner hereby withdraws the rejection of claims 9 and 11 under 35 USC 101 in light of the amendment.

Regarding claims 9 and 11, the applicant argues that the specification includes clear description and corresponding functionality of a program. The examiner respectfully disagrees. The applicant specifically argues that programs can include particular structure, especially in view of object-oriented programming wherein "objects" define the structure and corresponding functionality of a program. As noted in the Office Action mailed 12/07/2007, the claims appear to be directed to a program per se, but the limitations appear to be directed toward a particular structure. 35 USC 112, second paragraph requires that claims "particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." For means-plus-function elements, which are statutorily limited to the "corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof," 35 USC 112, sixth paragraph and 35 USC 112, second paragraph require that the specification must permit one of ordinary skill in the art to "know and understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation." For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm, "the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the the disclosed algorithm." Thus the patent must disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of ordinary skill in the art, enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure under 35 USC 112, sixth paragraph. Simply reciting "software" without providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function is not enough. "For a patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and then to disclose only a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to the 'corresponding structure. material, or acts' that perform the function, as required by 35 USC 112, sixth paragraph" (see the recent Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group decision on April 18, 2008 - opinion 07-1023 of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).

Regarding Applicant's argument that Stefik et al. teaches away from the invention, the examiner notes that "Arguments that the alleged anticipatory prior art is nonanalogous art' or teaches away from the invention' or is not recognized as solving the problem solved by the claimed invention, [are] not germane' to a rejection under section 102." Twin Disc, Inc. v. United States, 231 USPQ 417, 424 (Cl. Ct. 1986) (quoting In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 213 USPQ 1, 7 (CCPA 1982)). See also State Contracting & Eng ' g Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1068, 68 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (The question of whether a reference is analogous art is not relevant to whether that reference anticipates. A reference may be directed to an entirely different problem than the one addressed by the inventor, or may be from an entirely different field of endeavor than that of the claimed invention, yet the reference is still anticipatory if it explicitly or inherently discloses every limitation recited in the claims.). A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it. The question whether a reference "teaches away" from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis. Celeritas Technologies Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 USPQ2d 1516, 1522-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The prior art was held to anticipate the claims even though it taught away from the claimed invention. "The fact that a modern with a single carrier data signal is shown to be less than optimal does not vitiate the fact that it is disclosed."). >See Upsher-Smith Labs. v. Pamlab, LLC, 412 F.3d 1319, 1323, 75 USPQ2d 1213, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(claimed composition that expressly excluded an ingredient held anticipated by reference composition that optionally included that same ingredient);< see also Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1349, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Claimed composition was anticipated by prior art reference that inherently met claim limitation of "sufficient aeration" even though reference taught away from air entrapment or purposeful aeration.).

Further regarding claims 1, 6, and 9, the applicant argues that Stefik et al. fails to disclose said digital information itself providing functionality to said user terminal. The examiner respectfully disagrees. The applicant specifically argues that the usage rights of Stefik et al, only include a number of parameters and references that rely upon predefined secure functions performed by the "enforcement elements" to make use of such parameters accordingly. In other words, the applicant argues, the usage rights, in isolation, do not themselves provide any functionality, but they merely call functions already defined in the entities that refer to those usage rights for performing functions according to parameters defined in the usage rights. The examiner notes; however, that Applicant has not claimed that the digital information provides functionality in isolation. Furthermore, as noted in the Office Action mailed 12/07/2007, Stefik et al. discloses attaching metering rights to a digital work (col. 10, l. 58-64; col. 22, l. 51-56; col. 23, l. 13-26; col. 25, l. 35-38; & col. 26, l. 61-65). The credit server clock is used for metering usage fees (col. 14, I. 40-42). A Begin-charges transaction assigns a charge for metered use. An End-charges transaction ends a charge for metered use. A report-charges transaction between a personal credit server and a billing clearinghouse is invoked at least once per billing period, and is used to pass along information about charges (col. 31, l. 26-40). Stefik et al. also discloses that all billing transactions are given a transaction ID (col. 31, I. 43). The examiner notes that the metering rights do provide functionality to the credit server to autonomously monitor the utilization of contents, because the clock in the credit server would not monitor the time usage of contents if metered usage rights were not set. As such, the examiner maintains that Stefik et al. teaches "embedding digital information to said contents, said digital information itself providing functionality to said user terminal to autonomously monitor, and store, a contents utilizing history at the user terminal, and transmit the stored contents utilizing history along with identification information to said information gathering means at a predetermined timing while said user terminal is connected with said network," as currently claimed.